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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
COURT OF APPEALS 
June 3, 1991 
^ < 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
550 24th Street 
Suite 300 




Mary T. Noonan, Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RE: Mendez v. State of Utah: Case No. 900151-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Enclosed is a copy of the decision in Woods v. Deot. of Health 
and Social Services for the State of Wisconsin, Case No. 90 CV 65 
(Wise. Cir.Ct., Branch 3, Winnebago Co., Nov. 2, 1990) which is 
relevant to argument made in appellant's brief at pages 1 8 - 2 2 . 
Please have this decision associated with the record. 
Very truly yours, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
meb/cw 
Enclosures:9 
ccz Richard Hummel 
MICHAEL E. BDLSON" 
Attorney at Law 
\' 
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STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT 
BRANCH 3 
_K^f2-
Steven T. Woods, on behalf of g^ 
himself and his minor children, \f. 
Petitioner, •? 
Case # 90 CV 65 y~ _ f—/ -7 
Department of Health and Social DECISION 1V\ Z>J * / 
Services for the State of FOR REMAND -—. ^••\ 
Wisconsin VLY™^£^- - ••-'»-' 
and 
Outagamie County Department JlrV'x 
Social Services, .., P^V'.VJ^^ 
Respondents. Vf-iv y^iS-T'^'^A&Z 
Mr. Woods timely petitioned for review ui a decision of the 
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) dated 
October 30, 1989, pursuant to sec. 227.52 and 227.53, Wis, Stats. 
That.decision was the result of a fair hearing requested by the 
petitioner to review a decision of Outagamie County Department of 
Human Services (OCDHS). 
The attorney for DHSS who conducted that hearinq f'.'imci: 
that petitioner and h i r-> i aim i; re^eivta ArDC beginning June 
1
 1984; 
that on that date petitioner's wife owned life insurance 
with a cash surrender value of $614.85, which increased to 
$919.51, including a dividend balance, by Nov. 28, 198 6; 
that, as of July 29, 1984, petitioner owned life msumnrrj 
with a cash surrender value of $504.84; 
that,as of January 15, 1936, the Woods owned additional 
insurance on the life of their daughter with a cash surrender 
value of $245; 
that petitioner was declared eligible for SSI effective 
June 1, 1985, but did not begin to actually receive benefits 
until August, 1 98 6. 
He concluded that: 
from June 1, 1984 through July 31, 19 8 7, the cash surrender 
values of life insurance policies owned at any given time 
exceeded the $1,000 asset limit of $1,000,; 
the family had been overpaid AFDC in the amount n f $c:i in „i 
i
 f,fTJOon June 1, 1984 and August l, 1986; 
that OCDHS was required to recover that amount, regardless 
u. •;.%•-. :ausf.- ' the overpayment 
ne orderei, rihat tili-e peLitu n for review be dismissed. 
The standard for review of that decision is set-forth in 
sec. 227.57. The court reviews solely upon the record, and may 
reverse or remand if there was a material error in procedure, if 
the agency has erroneously interpreted the law, if the agency's 
finding is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, 
or if the agency's exercise of discretion is outside the range of 
discretion delegated to the agency by law. 
Petitioner argues that respondents should be equitably 
estopped from recovering the alleged overpayment, essentially 
arguing that the respondent erred as a matter of law in holding 
that OCDHS was required to recover the overpayment, regardless of 
the cause. He further argues that the respondents erred as a 
matter of law in considering petitioner's assets in making its 
determination after he was declared eligible for SSI but before 
he began to receive benefits. 
Respondents refused to consider the estoppel issue on 
grounds that recovery of overpayments is mandated by state and 
federal statutes and rules. The right of the state to recover 
AFDC payments is purely statutory. State ex rel. Reible, 91 Wis 
2d 394, 395 (CA 1979). An administrative agency has only those 
powers which are expressly conferred or necessarily implied from 
the statutory provisions under which it operates. Brown County 
v. H&&S Department, 103 Wis. 2d 37, 43 (1981). 
The general power of the respondents under the statutes to 
recover overpayments is not challenged. The issue raised is 
whether non-statutory limitations on the power to recover 
overpayments may be considered. 
It is clear that, even where the statutory power to act is 
established, an agency may be estopped from using that power 
where its own actions provide a basis for the estoppel. Dept. of 
Revenue v. Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis. 2d 610,. 634 (1979). 
I conclude that the record shows facts from which it might 
be found that petitioner has established action by OCDHS, 
reliance by petitioner, and detriment to him by such reliance, 
the ordinary elements of the defense of estoppel. However, I am 
not in a position to review possible credibility issues. 
Moreover, in the special instance of application of estoppel 
against state agencies, a determination must be made balancing 
the public interest at stake against the injustice that might be 
caused if the estoppel doctrine is not applied. State v. City of 
Green Bay, 96 Wis. 2d 195, 210 (1980). 
Since the court may only review on the record, and since the 
respondents1 refused to consider the issue, there is no finding 
to review as to the elements. The record contains no evidence as 
to the possible impact on the public interest, despite claims in 
respondents1 brief that such impact might be substantial. 'I 
conclude that the department erred as a matter of law in its 
refusal to consider that defense* 
Accordingly, the matter will be remanded for further 
consideration of the estoppel issue. 
Since on remand the issue of inclusion the value of 
petitioner's policy value may affect the issue of recoupment, the 
court will address it. 
Petitioner became eligible for SSI effective June 1, 1985, 
but did not begin to receive SSI benefits until August, 1986. 
42 U.S.C. 602(a)(24) provides that the state's plan must 
provide that an individual receiving SSI benefits shall not be 
regarded as a member of the family for the purpose of including 
his income and resources in determining the amount of AFDC 
benefits to be paid to the family. 
I conclude that the statute is not ambiguous, and that 
"receiving" has the normal, dictionary meaning of "to get, 
acquire from an outside source", "to take, as something that is 
offered, sent, paid or the like; to accept." That comports with 
the legislative intent of providing funds for persons who cannot 
meet the minimum needs of living. An unassignable expectancy 
puts no food on the table. 
Eligibility for benefits, without receiving them, does not 
qualify as "receiving", and I conclude that the respondents were 
correct in including petitioner's insurance values as a resource 
in determining eligibility until August, 1986. 
The matter is hereby remanded to the DHSS for further action 
consistent with this decision, and this action for review is 
dismissed. 
Dated this 2nd day of November, 1990 
By the Court, 
Thomas S. Williams 
Circuit Judge 
